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VIRGINIA SUBDIVISION LAW: AN
UNREASONABLE BURDEN ON THE UNWARY
Virginia statutory provisions concerning the subdivision of land'
are inadequate because no guarantee exists that particular homeown-
ers will be relieved from assuming the unexpected burden of street
maintenance.2 While dedicated and accepted subdivision streets lo-
cated within cities or towns are maintained by the respective local
authorities,3 complications arise when concern is focused on subdivi-
sion developments outside municipalities.
Although subdivision streets are conveyed to the respective
county,4 there is no legal obligation imposed upon county govern-
ments to maintain those roadways. Three factors support this propo-
sition. First, the Virginia Code contains provisions for the mainte-
nance of roads by the Commonwealth' and by municipalities.' How-
VA. CODE § 15.1-430(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides that a subdivision is either
a division of a parcel of land into three or more lots, each less than five acres in area,
for the purpose of transferring ownership or building development, or any division of
land which necessitates construction of a new street. This definition may be altered
in the subdivision ordinance enacted by a municipality or county. Id. The only limita-
tion upon local government redefinition of the composition or regulation of a subdivi-
sion is that the local governing unit must use that power and discretion reasonably in
light of local conditions and circumstances. Board of Supervisors v. Georgetown Land
Co., 204 Va. 380, 383-84, 131 S.E.2d 290, 292-93 (1963).
2 See text accompanying notes 15-24 infra. Homeowners have no obligation or
duty to maintain subdivision streets, "absent an appropriate covenant in the deed by
which their land was acquired." Letter from J. Westwood Smithers, Jr., Assistant
Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Virginia (on file in Washington and Lee
Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as Assistant Attorney General's Letter]. How-
ever, if no government body will maintain the streets, see text accompanying notes 5-
11 infra, the homeowner will be forced to assume the burden of maintenance if any
street repairs are to be made at all. This situation might lead to potential tort liability
for the homeowner if his faulty maintenance caused harm or injury. Cf. Tugman v.
Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills, 144 Va. 473, 132 S.E. 179 (1926) (landlord
without duty to repair may be liable for negligence if he voluntarily repairs and subse-
quently creates a dangerous condition).
' Before a town becomes responsible for maintaining subdivision streets, the pro-
cess of dedication and acceptance must have occurred. For an explanation of the
dedication procedure, see text accompanying notes 25-42 infra. Once a town has ac-
cepted a dedication, it must maintain the dedicated streets. Ocean Island Inn, Inc. v.
City of Virginia Beach, 216 Va. 474, 477, 220 S.E.2d 247, 250 (1975). See note 24 infra.
' See note 19 infra.
5 VA. CODE § 33.1-69 (Repl. Vol. 1976) provides that the state shall maintain all
roads within the state secondary highway system.
' VA. CODE § 15.1-889 (Cum Supp. 1976) states that a municipal corporation may
maintain roadways within the municipality.
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ever, there is no Code provision relating to county road maintenance.
The complete absence of any provision regarding county mainte-
nance implies that county governments have no such duty. Second,
the Code mandates that counties shall neither impose any road taxes
nor contract any indebtedness for road construction or maintenance.7
Third, the primary intent of the Byrd Road Law of 1932, which is still
in effect, is to relieve counties of any road maintenance and improve-
ment burden.8 Furthermore, the state is obligated to maintain county
subdivision roads only if certain state construction requirements are
met.' In contrast, to gain approval of the subdivision plan, the subdi-
vider must only fulfill county road specifications. Those county speci-
fications need not be equivalent to the specifications necessary for the
state to accept the road for maintenance purposes. 0 Therefore, situa-
' VA. CODE § 33.1-225 (Repl. Vol. 1976) provides that counties shall not levy
county road taxes nor contract any further indebtedness for the maintenance of roads.
Thus, the Code renders county financing of street maintenance impossible. The prior
indebtedness that may be satisfied by county road taxes consists of certain sinking
fund obligations to retire bond indebtedness established prior to the enactment of the
statute in 1932. See 1932 Va. Acts, ch. 415, at 873-74. An exception to the statute's
prohibition on county road taxes is created under circumstances where suburban con-
ditions exist. VA. CODE § 33.1-225 (Repl. Vol. 1976). Suburban conditions are created
by the overflow of population adjacent to a city containing 10,000 or more inhabitants.
See Va. Code § 33.1-225 (Repl. Vol. 1976) and § 15.1-1101 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
The preamble to the Byrd Road Law states that the purpose of the act is to
relieve counties of the burden of maintenance and improvement of streets, roads,
bridges, landings and wharves. 1932 Va. Acts, ch. 415, at 872. See County of Henrico
v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 754, 15 S.E.2d 309 (1941). See note 44 infra.
I A county road must be included within the state secondary highway system for
the state to have a maintenance burden. See VA. CODE § 33.1-69 (Repl. Vol. 1976); note
11 infra. To reach secondary highway status, state specifications must be met. For an
example of state secondary highway specifications, see note 10, infra.
" The specifications for inclusion into the state highway system frequently are
more detailed than those found in county subdivision ordinances. Comparison of the
Rockbridge County Subdivision Ordinance with the state requirements for secondary
highway status provides an example.
The state has employed a procedure for determining the amount of vehicles that
travel the street each day in order to determine the street's proper base and pavement
design. For streets that will be utilized by 250 vehicles or less per day, the minimum
base and subbase required by the state depends upon the material used, but a non-
concrete base and subbase must have a depth of at least six inches. If the amount of
daily traffic is between 250 and 400 vehicles per day, then a total base and subbase
depth of six to eight inches is required. Five categories based upon the quantity of
traffic have been developed by the state, with each succeeding category increasing the
depth requirements of the base and subbase. Letter of J.E. Harwood, then Deputy
Commissioner and Chief Engineer of the State Department of Highways to the Boards
of Supervisors of All Counties in the Secondary System, establishing standards for
qualification within the State Secondary System (Oct. 3, 1968) (letter on file at the
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tions may arise where no government body would be bound to main-
tain the subdivision roads."
The result of the Virginia statutory scheme can be extremely vex-
ing and financially burdensome for an unwary homeowner because he
may become responsible, as a practical matter, for any necessary
maintenance of the subdivision streets.' 2 This situation may develop
even though there has been a dedication and subsequent acceptance
of the streets for public use by the proper governing body, 3 and a
transfer of the streets in fee simple to the local government.
The worst possible situation for the subdivision homeowner might
develop in the following manner. A professional developer wishes to
develop a subdivision in the county beyond the limits of any incorpo-
rated town. To realize this venture, the developer must comply with
the statutory requirements concerning subdivisions. Virginia requires
Washington and Lee Law Review office).
In contrast, the Rockbridge County Subdivision Ordinance requires only a base
of five inches in depth of stone, gravel, or "other satisfactory stabilizing material
approved by the State Highway Department," regardless of the expected vehicle
traffic. Subdivision Ordinance of Rockbridge County, Virginia Appendix A, § (d).
Likewise, Roanoke County only requires that the "[b]ase for pavement shall be at
least . . .5 inches in depth and be of stone, gravel, or other satisfactory stabilizing
material meeting State Highway Department Specification." Roanoke County Land
Subdivision Ordinance § IX B. Thus, a subdivision street may fulfill the subsurface
requirements of the county subdivision ordinance but fail to meet state requirements.
1 No governing body has a legal obligation to maintain a county subdivision road
if it does not meet the specifications for inclusion within the state highway system.
Assistant Attorney General's Letter, supra note 2. See text accompanying notes 5-9
supra.
12 See note 2 supra.
12 Subdivision streets generally become public roads by the process of dedication
and acceptance. See text accompanying notes 15-17, 25-29 infra.
" VA. CODE § 15.1-478 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See note 19 infra. The Code appears
redundant by requiring a subdivider to dedicate the streets for public use prior to plat
approval, even though recordation of the plat will automatically transfer the fee to the
county. See text accompanying notes 15-17 infra; note 19 infra. Title to the streets will
ultimately vest in the county under either method. See note 43 infra. One possible
explanation for this profusion of methods is that Virginia might require an acceptance
before a statutory dedication is completed and the accepting government body be-
comes responsible for street maintenance. See text accompanying notes 26-37 infra.
This reasoning may permit an official act of acceptance prior to recordation so that
the succeeding statutory dedication immediately will be complete. Such a procedure
is reasonable for municipalities, since they have a potential duty to maintain. How-
ever, the need for acceptance of county roads is unreasonable, as counties have no duty
to maintain whatsoever. See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra, 38-41 infra. Thus, the
Code's imposition of a dedication and acceptance requirement prior to plat approval,
as well as a requirement of statutory dedication upon recordation, appears unnecessary
for county subdivision streets.
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all counties and municipalities to adopt ordinances regulating the
subdivision of land, 5 to which the developer must adhere for his plat
to gain approval by the county authorities. 6 The subdivision ordi-
nances, encompassing many detailed requirements, must particu-
larly include provisions for the dedication and acceptance of streets
for public use. 17 The plat is then submitted to county authorities for
their approval. 8 Assuming that all county specifications have been
followed and the plat has been approved, the developer then records
the plat. This recordation transfers the land upon which the streets
lie to the county in fee simple." Houses are subsequently built on the
subdivision parcels and sold.
When the-streets eventually require maintenance, the homeown-
ers will probably contact their local public authorities. Only then
might they discover the possibility that no public authority is legally
bound to maintain the streets. If the county subdivision ordinance
contains standards inferior to those necessary for inclusion within the
state highway system, and the subdivision was built pursuant to the
county standards, the state will not maintain the roads. Since the
county has no duty to maintain, 2 the substantial cost of any mainte-
nance will be borne by the homeowner.2' This burden arises even
though the streets have probably been dedicated and accepted by the
county as a public way,22 and title to the streets has passed to the
" VA. CODE § 15.1-465 (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides that "[ihe governing body
of any county or municipality shall adopt an ordinance to assure the orderly subdivi-
sion of land and its development." If a county subdivision ordinance does not require
minimum state specifications and thus fails to ensure the maintenance of subdivision
roads, it is questionable whether the ordinance provides for "orderly" development.
" VA. CODE § 15.1-475 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
," VA. CODE § 15.1-466 (f) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
" VA. CODE § 15.1-475 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
" VA. CODE § 15.1-478 (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides that "[ihe recordation of
such plat shall operate to transfer, in fee simple, to the respective counties and munici-
palities in which the land lies such portion of the premises platted as is on such plat
set apart for streets, alleys, or other public use. ... Since the fee to the streets is
always transferred to the county or town upon the developer's recordation of his plat,
the subsequent homeowners will never own the fee to the streets they may be forced
to maintain, assuming the recordation acts as a complete dedication. See text accom-
panying notes 26-41 infra.
2' See text accompanying notes 4-8 supra.
21 If a subdivision street is poorly constructed and cannot be accepted by the State
Highway Department for maintenance purposes, then the adjoining landowners
usually cooperate to maintain the streets. Assistant Attorney General's Letter, supra
note 2. However, those landowners generally have no legal duty to maintain. See note
2 supra.
22 The current statute requires that "[a] subdivision ordinance shall include . ..
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county in fee simple.2 3 Virginia's statutes consequently conflict with
the widely recognized principle that the accepting public authority
bears the duty to maintain.
24
A review of the general law regarding subdivision roads is neces-
sary to highlight the Virginia statutory oversight. Subdivision streets
usually become public roads by dedication of the streets for public
use by the landowner and subsequent acceptance by the proper gov-
erning authorities.25 The Virginia Supreme Court has held that the
filing or recordation of a subdivision plat constitutes an offer of dedi-
cation.28 While acceptance is normally required for common law dedi-
regulations ... that apply to or provide: ... (f) For the acceptance of dedication for
public use of any right-of-way located within any subdivision ... only if the owner or
developer" assumes the responsibility of street construction costs to the satisfaction
of the governing body. VA. CODE § 15.1-466(f) (Cum. Supp. 1976). This statute may
be interpreted in two ways. First, if the "construction costs" requirement is met, then
the local government must accept the dedication. This interpretation is supported by
dictum from the Virginia Supreme Court in Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128,
216 S.E.2d 199 (1975). The court stated that the statute "would support an inference
that local governing bodies . . . are empowered to require an offer and acceptance of
dedication for access roads and other public facilities as the price of property develop-
ment." Id. at 138 (emphasis added). Since the county must now require an acceptance
of a dedication, and an acceptance will have occurred if a proposed subdivision plan
is allowed to proceed to development, then all subdivision streets constructed subse-
quent to this statute must have been accepted.
Alternatively, the statute may be interpreted as providing the governing body with
discretion to accept a dedication only if the developer has assumed construction costs
to the governing body's satisfaction. The former interpretation compels acceptance
while the latter does not. However, acceptance will be implied if the road has been
sufficiently subjected to public use. Ocean Island Inn, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach,
216 Va. 474, 477, 220 S.E.2d 247, 250 (1975). Furthermore, acceptance will be implied
if government action has occasioned the installation of public utility lines in or across
the roadways. Id. Hence, under either interpretation of the statute, an acceptance of
the dedication probably has occurred.
23See note 19 supra.
11 If the appropriate governing body has accepted a dedication of streets, the
burden of maintaining those streets is usually placed on the accepting public authori-
ties. 2 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY, § 372, at 493 (Repl. Vol. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as THOMPSON]; see 11 E. McQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 33.44, at 738-39 (3d
ed. rev. 1964) [hereinafter cited MCQUILLEN]. The Virginia Supreme Court has re-
cently reaffirmed this principle, stating that "[slince a completed dedication imposes
the burden of maintenance and potential tort liability upon the public, a dedication
does not become complete until the public or competent public authority manifests
an intent to accept the offer." Ocean Island Inn, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 216
Va. 474, 477, 220 S.E.2d 247, 250 (1975). Intent to accept may be manifested expressly
or impliedly. Id. See note 22 supra.
THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 369, at 461-71; § 372, at 492.
2, Recordation of a subdivision plat and the subsequent sale of lots constitutes a
common law offer of dedication. Ocean Island Inn, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 216
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cations,2 formal acceptance by public authorities is not always neces-
sary if the dedication occurs pursuant to statute.2 Many jurisdictions
impose a requirement of acceptance, even if there has been a statuto-
rily compelled dedication, before any liability for road maintenance
can be imposed upon the accepting government.29 Although the Vir-
ginia cases are ambiguous, 30 acceptance of a statutory dedication may
be necessary before a dedication is complete and the accepting public
authority becomes responsible for the maintenance of the subdivision
streets.
The Virginia Supreme Court has not commented on the current
statutory dedication provision, although it has construed its forerun-
ners. Under former dedication statutes, 3' the court held that although
recordation created a public right of passage over the subdivision
streets, the streets would not be considered county roads until they
had been accepted by county authorities.32 Those decisions are not
fully determinative of the acceptance issue, however, because the
former statutes technically did not create a statutory dedication.
While recordation created a public right of passage,3 it failed to
result in the transfer of the underlying fee to a specific public body.
3
Va. 474, 477, 220 S.E.2d 247, 250 (1975). See, e.g., Nash v. Pendleton, 183 Ark. 339,
35 S.W.2d 1002 (1931); Volpe v. Marina Parks, Inc., 101 R.I. 80, 220 A.2d 525, 529
(1966).
21 THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 372, at 493.
21 State courts disagree as to whether acceptance is necessary when the dedication
is compelled by statute. For a collection of cases concerning the necessity of acceptance
after statutory dedication, see McQUILLEN, supra note 24, § 33.44, at 737.
29 In those jurisdictions where an acceptance is necessary to complete a dedication
imposed by statute, the presence of a statute that transfers the fee upon recordation
neither operates as an acceptance nor imposes any maintenance liability. People ex
rel. Tilden v. Massieon, 279 Ill. 312, 116 N.E. 639 (1917); Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D.
504, 154 N.W. 195 (1915). See McQUILLEN, supra note 24, § 33.44, at 737-39.
"' See note 32 infra; text accompanying notes 33-37 infra.
3" VA. CODE § 5219 (1919); VA. CODE § 2510a(3) (1904).
32 See Genheimer v. Crystal Spring Land Co., 155 Va. 134, 154 S.E. 489, 491
(1930); Washington-Va. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 121 Va. 229, 92 S.E. 809 (1917). The
Genheimer court stated that the vesting of the rights of the public was conditional
upon the "acceptance of the street by the county or city." 155 Va. at 141, 154 S.E. at
491. In Fisher, the court held that acceptance by county authorities was necessary
before the platted streets became county roads or highways. 121 Va. at 234, 92 S.E. at
811. 81 VA. CODE § 5219 (1919) provided in part that the "recording of such plat...
create[s] a public easement or right of passage over such portion of the premises
platted .. .set aside for streets. ... VA. CODE § 2510(a)(3) (1904) contains the
same wording. For a comparison with the language in the present Code, see note 19
supra.
" See Cottrell Real Estate, Ins. & Loan Co. v. Hampton Roads Ry. & Elec. Co.,
LAND SUBDIVISION BURDENS
The preceding statutes are analogous to the present one, in that they
required the dedication of subdivision streets for public use, and an
acceptance by public authorities was required for a complete dedica-
tion. Likewise, the prior decisions may provide guidance as to how
Virginia courts will interpret the current dedication statute.
Further support for the contention that acceptance is necessary to
complete a statutory dedication comes from a recent Virginia Su-
preme Court decision, Board of Supervisors v. Rowe,35 where the
court discussed both the acceptance-of-dedication statute and the
transfer-of-the-fee-upon-recordation provision. The court noted that
local governments may require "an offer and acceptance of dedica-
tions . . . as the price of property development," without further
mentioning the effect of the recordation statute.36 This language
might nullify the recordation statute as a means for causing a com-
plete dedication without acceptance. In addition, now that counties
and municipalities must include an acceptance-of-dedication provi-
sion in their subdivision ordinances,37 the significance of the Rowe
language might be to solidify the dedication and acceptance proce-
dure as the sole method for effecting a complete dedication.
Conversely, the underlying policy for requiring acceptance is that
governing units should not be held responsible for repairs and main-
tenance of unaccepted roads. 8 This policy argument is not applicable
to Virginia county subdivision roads because there is no county main-
tenance duty that the act of acceptance would trigger.39 Therefore,
acceptance arguably is not necessary when the concern is county
subdivision roads, and the statutory dedication alone, which trans-
fers the fee to the county upon recordation, 0 is sufficient to create a
public road." Even if acceptance were necessary, county officials
7 VA. LAW REG. 476, 480 (Warwick County Cir. Ct. 1901); note 43 infra.
216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
216 Va. at 138, 216 S.E.2d at 208.
3' VA. CODE § 15.1-466(f) (Cum. Supp. 1976). See note 22 supra. This amended
section mandates that subdivision ordinances shall include dedication and acceptance
procedures. Prior to the amendment, the statute merely stated that subdivision ordi-
nances may include dedication and acceptance regulations.
3 See Ocean Island Inn, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 216 Va. 474, 477, 220
S.E.2d 247 (1975); Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, 202 (1915) (citing E.
MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 1577 (1st ed. 1904)).
31' The county has no duty to maintain roadways under any circumstances, see text
accompanying notes 5-8 supra, so acceptance by the county board of supervisors would
fail to effectuate the policy's purpose.
" See note 19 supra.
" Aside from policy considerations, authority exists for the proposition that the
statutory dedication alone is sufficient to create a public road, rendering acceptance
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probably have accepted the dedication anyway, either expressly or
impliedly.42
Under the statutory dedication procedure, the Virginia developer
conveys the subdivision streets in fee to the county.43 Thus, the dedi-
cated streets become public roads. Under the statutory scheme, all
public county roads may be embraced in the secondary highway sys-
tem," which the state is obligated to maintain." However, this blan-
ket inclusion of all public roads into the secondary system is subject
to qualification. The state will accept and maintain only those county
roads meeting necessary minimum state standards."
Because state specifications may be different from and more bur-
densome than the requirements imposed by county subdivision ordi-
nances,47 the statutory scheme results in a confusing situation con-
cerning the maintenance of the streets within a county subdivision.
The subdivision may have met all necessary county specifications
and the fee to the streets may have been transferred to the county
through the process of recordation. Nevertheless, the county has no
duty to maintain. 8 Furthermore, the Commonwealth will maintain
the streets only if its construction specifications are fulfilled. If the
secondary highway system standards are stricter than the applicable
county standards, and the subdivision streets are built to the less
stringent county standards, the state will not be required to provide
irrelevant. The Attorney General's office has issued an opinion in regard to a transfer
of title by recordation of a subdivision plat. According to the opinion, the county need
not perform any further act for the dedication to be complete. Op. ATr'Y GEN. OF VA.
243 (1966). This opinion has been interpreted as meaning that "after approval of the
plat, no further overt act is required by county or city officials to complete the
dedication." Op. ATr'Y GEN. OF VA. 330 (1975) (emphasis added).
12 See note 22 supra.
' In contrast to common law dedication, which fails to alter legal ownership, a
statutory dedication carried out by the act of recordation involves a direct conveyance
of the legal title to the municipality or county. 4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 1105,
at 600 (3d ed. 1975).
" VA. CODE § 33.1-67 (Repl. Vol. 1976) provides that "[tihe secondary system of
State highways shall consist of all of the public roads . . . in the several counties of
the State not included in the State Highway System .... " Originally enacted in 1932
as the Byrd Road Law, the purpose of the statute was to relieve counties from the
maintenance, construction, and improvement of roadways. To accomplish this goal, a
secondary system of state highways, controlled and directed by the State Department
of Highways, was developed. See 1932 Va. Acts, ch. 415, at 872. See also County of
Henrico v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 754, 15 S.E.2d 309 (1941).
* VA. CODE § 33.1-69 (Repl. Vol. 1976). See note 5 supra.
* VA. CODE § 33.1-72(c), (d) (Repl. Vol. 1976). See note 9, 10 supra.
*7 See note 10 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 4-8 supra.
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maintenance. Thus, no government, either state or local, will be obli-
gated to maintain the subdivision streets. Although the road is open
to public use and the homeowner does not own the street, he may
have to pay the substantial costs of maintenance and repair if the
street is to be maintained at all. 9
Homeowners may upgrade subdivision streets to meet minimum
state standards, but at considerable expense. Financial relief, how-
ever, is available if certain conditions exist." Under the Virginia stat-
ute, if the subdivision street was platted and recorded prior to July
1, 1958, is open and utilized by automobiles, and has at least three
families per mile, it is eligible for inclusion in the state secondary
system with no cost to the landowners." However, the county must
contribute one-half of the cost necessary to improve the streets so as
to meet minimum state standards. 2 If the county does meet one-half
of the cost, the state will supply the other half. 3 Dollar limitations
on state funds and restrictions on "mileage available" in each county
further limit the scope of this method of inclusion.54 These limitations
significantly affect the viability of this inclusion process.
A different means for achieving secondary highway status exists
for those streets which meet the vehicle use and mileage require-
ments" and which were recorded on a plat between July 1, 1958, and
July 1, 1975. The abutting homeowners personally may have to fi-
nance the improvements necessary to become part of the secondary
, See note 2 supra.
VA. CODE § 33.1-72(c), (d) (Repl. Vol. 1976).
5, VA. CODE § 33.1-72(a), (c) (Repl. Vol. 1976).
52 VA. CODE § 33.1-72(c) (Repl. Vol. 1976).
Id. Impliedly, if the county refuses to contribute one-half of the necessary funds,
then the state need not provide any funds or assistance to the homeowner.
5' VA. CODE § 33.1-72(c), (d) (Repl. Vol. 1976). The funding and mileage limita-
tions are part of the State Department of Highway's rural addition.policy. The annual
mileage limtation is "1 1/4% of the existing Secondary mileage of a particular county
at the end of the preceding calendar year, while the funding limitation is 2% of the
initial allocation of funds for use on the Secondary System in such county." Letter
from A.S. Brown, State Secondary Roads Engineer for the Virginia State Department
of Highways & Transportation (on file in Washington and Lee Law Review office).
" These limitations impose two substantial obstacles to inclusion in the state
secondary system. If the county fails to contribute half of the necessary revenue, the
subdivision streets arguably are denied inclusion and therefore state maintenance. See
note 53 supra. Even if the county provides the appropriate funding, the additional
mileage and financial limitations imposed by the state are so restrictive that the
subdivision streets may not qualify for inclusion in the state system. The practical
effect of these qualifications on inclusion is to leave the street outside the state system
and the homeowner without public maintenance.
5' See text accompanying note 51 supra.
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system. The total cost of such improvements is to be funded either
by county revenue or a special assessment of the landowners on the
street in question or a combination of both. 7 The special assessment
may not be employed, however, unless seventy-five per cent of the
affected homeowners consent. 8 Each landowner's assessment of up to
one-third of the current value for tax purposes of his abutting prop-
erty demonstrates the potential magnitude of the costs generated by
the improvements. 9 These substantial costs limit the effectiveness of
the assessment method for attaining secondary highway status. 0
Moreover, neither method for inclusion within the secondary sys-
tem is available if the county has not adopted a subdivision ordinance
that requires adherence to state specifications as a precondition for
plat approval.' In those counties not applying the minimum state
specifications, the total cost to meet the state standards presumably
must be assumed by the homeowners.2
The subdivision homeowner may still be responsible for the total
cost necessary to include the street within the state secondary system
even in counties that have adopted state specifications in their subdi-
vision ordinances. The statutory provisions cover only those streets
platted and recorded prior to July 1, 1975.3 Any street platted and
17 VA. CODE § 33.1-72(d) (Repl. Vol. 1976) provides that an appropriate street may
be recommended for and included into the state secondary highway system if the
county "agrees to contribute from county revenue and/or the special assessment of the
landowners on the new street in question the cost to bring the new street up to the
necessary minimum standards for acceptance .... "
K Id. The county officials cannot decide to bring a street into the secondary
system and subsequently assess the abutting landowners without having previously
gained the landowners' ratification.
11 Id. The value of the abutting property can be quite substantial in a contempo-
rary subdivision. Assuming a conservative figure of $30,000, such a landowner may be
assessed up to $10,000 for improving the streets to state minimum specifications. If a
large quantity of improvement is necessary and few landowners are involved, the
assessment would become exorbitant.
0 Limitations with regard to mileage available in the county for inclusion into the
secondary system and state funding restrictions also reduce the plausibility of the
assessment method. Id. See note 54 supra.
VA. CODE § 33.1-72(b) (Repl. Vol. 1976).
62 Since the methods of inclusion into the state secondary system which partially
or totally negate the homeowner's costs are statutorily provided only for streets in
counties with subdivision ordinances containing state specifications, no such cost
abatement is available in counties not containing those state requirements. Therefore,
homeowners in those counties cannot rely on any statute to reduce their costs, and
would have to pay the total cost if they wish to have their streets included in the state
secondary system.
" VA. CODE § 33.1-72 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
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recorded after that date, but before the county adopted state specifi-
cations in its subdivision ordinance, is not covered by the statute.
Under these circumstances, the homeowner will be forced to assume
the total cost of necessary improvements, since the county may nei-
ther contract any indebtedness for road maintenance nor levy a road
tax6 unless done for the purpose of including within the secondary
system a street platted and recorded prior to July 1, 1975.15 Thus,
under the current scheme the homeowner is left with two costly alter-
natives: continuous homeowner maintenance or street improvements
sufficient to meet the minimum state specifications. Either result
seems incompatible with the fact that the county owns the underly-
ing fee to the streets.66
The Virginia statutory scheme for subdivision street maintenance
makes little sense in regard to county subdivisions." To require the
developer to convey the fee to the streets while simultaneously forcing
the subsequent homeowner to maintain the streets seem incongruous
with widely recognized legal principles concerning the transfer of a
right-of-way to a governing body for public use.6" Furthermore, the
purchasing homeowner who has had to mortgage his property proba-
bly has little equity available to finance either street maintenance or
" VA. CODE § 33.1-225 (Repl. Vol. 1976). See note 7 supra.
" VA. CODE § 33.1-72(f) (Repl. Vol. 1976).
9' See note 43 supra.
A major difficulty with analyzing the statutory scheme is the absence of any
system for recording Virginia legislative history. One anomalous facet of the subdivi-
sion statutes is that upon recordation the fee is transferred to the county, while the
state is the only government body with a potential duty to maintain. VA. CODE § 15.1-
478 (Cum. Supp. 1976) and VA. CODE §§ 33.1-67, -69 (Repl. Vol. 1976). See text
accompanying notes 4-8 supra; notes 19 and 44 supra. An examination of prior statu-
tory schemes fails to shed light on the problem. The Byrd Road Law was established
primarily to relieve counties of the burden of maintenance. 1932 Va. Acts, ch. 415, at
872. Prior to that act the counties were responsible for road maintenance. See GEN.
LAws OF VA. § 1976 (1923); VA. CODE §§ 944-a(1) and (21) (1904). Beginning in 1923,
the Virginia Code specifically required transfer of the underlying fee of subdivision
streets to the Commonwealth. GEN. LAws OF VA. § 5222-3 (1923). In contrast, since
1946, the Code has required transfer of the fee to the respective county or municipality.
VA. CODE § 5225(f) (Cum. Supp. 1946); see note 19 supra. Thus, from 1923 to 1932,
the state obtained the fee to subdivision streets while the county had the responsibility
to maintain them. The opposite situation has been in force since 1946. The only period
when both ownership right and maintenance duty were placed in one governing body
was from 1932 to 1946, when both the right and the duty were vested in the state. The
reason for this separation of ownership and maintenance duty is not apparent, and the
division would seem to foster complications that could presently plague county subdi-
vision homeowners. See text accompanying notes 15-24 supra.
6 See note 24 supra.
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the possibly substantial improvements necessary to gain acceptance
into the state secondary highway system." The burdens imposed
upon county subdivision homeowners by the present Virginia scheme
are significant and probably more than the purchasing homeowner
expected.
Modification of Virginia laws for the responsibility of maintaining
county subdivision streets appears necessary. Inconsistencies regard-
ing both the division of street ownership and responsibility of mainte-
nance, 0 and the methods available to homeowners for including sub-
division streets within the state secondary highway system,"' should
be eliminated. More importantly, certain Code provisions should be
revised to provide for a more reasonable statutory scheme concerning
subdivision street maintenance.
72
Three possible modifications could relieve subdivision homeown-
ers from the difficulties created by the present Virginia Code. First,
the fee to the subdivision streets could be transferred upon recorda-
tion to the state instead of the county.73 Simultaneously, a provision
should be drawn either negating the necessity for acceptance of a
statutory dedication of county subdivision roads or mandating ac-
ceptance if appropriate conditions exist. 7 This alteration would in-
sure that the street would be statutorily dedicated to and accepted
by the Commonwealth, which would then be obligated to provide
necessary maintenance.7 5 Although this modification circumvents the
" The average homeowner who has recently purchased in a subdivision often will
have applied most of his savings to the down payment and probably will be in debt to
lending institutions. Indeed, banks and loan companies frequently loan from 75% to
90% of the purchase price. These potential consequences of acquiring a subdivision
home do not leave the equity that may be required to finance street maintenance or
improvements. See note 59 supra.
71 See note 67 supra.
1, See text accompanying notes 50-65 supra.
72 A Subdivision ordinance is a zoning regulation and therefore must both be
reasonable and promote the public health, safety and welfare. Board of County Super-
visors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 662, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395, 396 (1959). A subdivision
ordinance that fails to impose any duty of street maintenance on some governing body
arguably is unreasonable and fails to promote public health, safety and welfare.
71 The modified statute would generally provide that upon recordation of a subdi-
vision plat, the streets within the subdivision would be transferred in fee simple to the
state or respective municipality for public use. Cf. VA. CODE § 15.1-478 (Cum. Supp.
1976) (recordation transfers the streets to the respective county or municipality). See
note 19 supra.
7' These conditions should not be extensive and could be limited to assurances of
payment of construction costs as found in the present Code. See note 22 supra.
71 The acceptance by the state of a dedication of streets imposes a burden upon
the state to maintain them. THoMPsON, supra note 24 § 372, at 493. Hence, mandatory
LAND SUBDIVISION BURDENS
necessity for inclusion within the secondary highway system, it raises
an additional problem. The state is not likely to accept the responsi-
bility of road maintenance on such a broad scale without qualifica-
tions. Therefore, the state might subsequently limit the roadways it
will maintain, with such limitations possibly being similar or equiva-
lent to those now imposed for acceptance into the secondary system.1
6
Hence, the county subdivision homeowner may well have achieved
nothing through this statutory modification. Alternatively, a com-
pletely different highway scheme might be introduced, whereby cer-
tain roads could be designated as county roads as opposed to state
roads. 7 Additional provisions would bind the county to maintain all
county roads, 8 including streets in county subdivisions. However,
since Virginia counties have not had the duty of maintenance since
1932,'7 this plan may not be economically feasible or desirable for the
counties. "
Finally, the Commonwealth could require that all county subdivi-
sion ordinances adopt the specifications necessary for state secondary
highway status.8' This last alternative may well be the most efficient
dedication to and acceptance of the fee by the state would place the responsibility of
maintenance with the state. This would alleviate the problem created by the Virginia
Code's failure to require any county maintenance. VA. CODE § 33.1-225 (Repl. Vol.
1976). See text accompanying notes 4-8 supra.
78 See note 10 supra.
" An example of such a statutory scheme is found in the New Jersey Code, where
state highway routes are specifically delineated. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27.6-1 (West 1966).
Those routes are to be maintained by the State Highway Department. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 27:5B-1 (West 1966). Further provisions allow the county to acquire county roads.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:16-2 (West 1966).
11 The parallel example in the New Jersey Code, placing the duty of maintenance
of county roads on the county, is found in N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:16-5, -6 (West 1966).
" See text accompanying notes 4-8 supra; note 67 supra.
In conjunction with this plan, the current Virginia statute forbidding the impo-
sition of county road taxes should probably be changed. See note 7 supra. Hence, the
homeowner may suffer an immediate increase in his tax burden without gaining the
advantage of adequate road repairs, since the county initially will lack sufficient repair
equipment and management experience.
1' A similar idea was introduced in the Virginia Legislature in 1974. H.B. 879, 1974
Session. The bill proposed a Minimum Statewide Subdivision Standards Act. In pre-
paring the standards, the State Secretary of Commerce and Resources was to consult
with various state agencies, including the Department of Highways. This input would
result in uniform minimum subdivision standards, designed to be applied statewide.
Id. The bill was not passed by the legislature. One difference between that bill and
the proposed alternative is that the proposed alternative only applies minimum subdi-
vision requirements to county ordinances. Moreover, under the proposed alternative,
state secondary highway specifications would be definitely stipulated as the minimum
requirement.
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and convenient of the three methods discussed. 2 No change in fee
ownership would be necessary and a suitable statewide subdivision
standard would be created. While the initial cost for these more strin-
gent requirements would ultimately be borne by the subdivision
homeowner in the form of higher real estate prices, the homeowner
still gains through this method.8 The responsibility of maintenance
then would rest with the state, 4 relieving the homeowner of the un-
welcome surprise of personally having to finance the upkeep and
repair of the subdivision roads. Likewise, this method benefits the
homeowner in an inflationary economy. Although he indirectly bears
the costs of including the subdivision streets in the state secondary
system, such costs would be lower at the time of purchase than sev-
eral years later when repair and maintenance become necessary.
Therefore, by meeting the state specifications at the time of pur-
chase, the homeowner can reduce the effect of inflationary spiral.
While other alternatives and statutory schemes could be em-
ployed to alleviate the present maintenance problem of Virginia
county subdivision streets, the easiest means to relieve homeowners
of those difficulties may be a statute requiring all county subdivision
ordinances to adhere to state secondary highway specifications. Re-
gardless of which alternative may be the wisest, Virginia should
adopt a reasonable and practical scheme that will alleviate the pres-
ent unreasonable burden placed on county subdivision homeowners.
FRANK F. BARR
This proposed modification would have no retroactive effect, leaving current
county subdivision homeowners in their present situation. To combat this problem,
additional alterations should be made in the Virginia subdivision scheme. Statutes
regarding the funding of improvements necessary for state secondary highway inclu-
sion must be included, with access to state and county revenue provided for all those
subdivision homeowners who previously purchased lots under a county ordinance
which did not match state specifications. This would be merely an expansion of a
method already existing under the Code, possibly with some of the imposed limitations
either reduced or discontinued. See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
The developer must immediately pay the higher cost of adhering to more rigid
state standards in order to gain approval of his subdivision plat. These costs will
ultimately be paid by the homeowners though, as the developer distributes his costs
in the form of increased sale prices for subdivision lots.
" Since the county subdivision street would meet state specifications, it would be
able to acquire state secondary highway status. The state then will have a statutory
duty to maintain. VA. CODE § 33.1-69 (Repl. Vol. 1976). See note 5 supra.
